6th Conference - Day 2 Summaries

Plenary 5- ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS AND VOLUNTARY MEASURES
Lorenzo Thomas presented Mexico's National Program of Environmental Audits, a voluntary program to support enterprises to comply with environmental laws and to recognize environmental performance. It is a three stage approach starting with a self evaluation to identify deficiencies and to find opportunities for improvement. For this self evaluation guidelines were developed by Profepa in a participatory process with industry and the public. The second stage is an Environmental Compliance and Clean Industry Certificate awarded for compliance with environmental requirements and the third stage the Environment Excellence Certificate recognizing companies that go beyond law requirements. There is a Committee for ethical, technical as well as risk analyses issues and an Advisory Council for the elaboration of the audit schemes. The auditors are certified with the Mexican Crediting Entity; there are now about 170 auditors. So far mainly the big industry participated (oil company, electricity companies) but they were the main polluters. The aim is to get all companies involved. The program is being extended to also cover industrial parks, productive chains, municipalities, tourist destinations and others like hospitals or airports. The purposes of the Environmental Audits Program are to create greater conscience and responsibility for environmental protection, to encourage an environmental prevention culture and thus to contribute to a daily observation of these principles in society.

Lawrence Pratt dealt with frameworks for considering voluntary agreements in developing countries whereby firms or industry agree to meet certain goals and objectives to improve environmental performance and compliance. In his view there is a general lack of understanding of the expectations of industry and companies. He pointed at the issues that motivate companies (efficiency, costs, market position, image, fears) and the ones that impede companies (lack of information, existing policy structures). Voluntary agreements can serve to achieve environmental goals, reduce costs to the State, harness other forces to advance environmental protection (market, societal concerns, knowledge) and serve as more efficient means. He showed areas and conditions where voluntary agreements can be fruitful instruments to enlarge the tool box for environmental measures, esp. in the "macro" area. Forward looking issues, opportunities for collective action or certain alignments of interests can be viable areas for voluntary agreements as well as areas where action by one company alone would be self destructive, but action by all of a sector would benefit all. Also areas where a "prize" or recognition from the State is given, like a label for sustainable tourism or in the field of energy efficiency, or where fear is credible and solutions visible are fruitful for voluntary agreements. He appealed for a better understanding of what motivates companies and to make more use of the instrument of voluntary agreements.

Beatrice Olivastri spoke about her ten years experience in participating in voluntary non-regulatory initiative (VNRIs) from the side of an environmental NGO. As regulation making is very expensive and takes a lot of time there was search for alternatives. She stressed that voluntary initiatives need the platform of regulations and cannot go instead of regulations. She presented the criteria and principles developed by NGOs, industry and government for voluntary initiatives in Canada. The criteria comprise the positioning of VNRIs within a supportive policy framework of laws and regulations, the agreement of interested and effected parties on VNRIs as an effective method to achieve environmental protection objectives, sufficient participation in the VNRI over the long term, clearly defined roles and responsibilities plus mechanisms to be able to fulfill these roles. The principles governing the design of VNRIs comprise equitable participation of interested and affected parties, transparency, rewards for good performance and consequences of not meeting performance objectives, milestones, timetables and monitoring mechanisms as important parts of the agreement. She gave three examples and reported on the experiences gained with them: 1) Accelerated reduction and elimination of toxics with chemical industry on 117 specific substances which had questionable results, but also some success for broad acceptance by government and industry; 2) Recycling management corporation to collect CFCs used in commercial refrigeration which had a regulatory backdrop in case of non-performance and 3) the Province of Ontario's cooperative agreements' pilot project on voluntary reduction of pollutants as a complementary tool to inspections with offers of technical assistance. She concluded that voluntary initiatives can accelerate the pace of environmental protection, but need built in indicators to measure results.

In the discussion the question of the cost effectiveness of voluntary measures was raised. Pratt and Thomas responded that the objective is to achieve efficient results and that voluntary measures can be up to 70% cheaper or not cheaper for industry, for the state they can also be more expensive. The second topic of the discussion was the area of application for economic instruments, whether they are only applied to the "brown" environmental agenda (air pollution, waste, soil) or also to the "green" agenda (national parks, forestry, biolife). In Costa Rica, Mexico and Canada they are also used in the green agenda, esp. in forestry, in Africa for wild life management.

The presentations and discussions of the Panel showed that voluntary initiatives can serve as valuable tools besides but not instead of regulatory schemes. They may help to achieve faster results, may be applied in areas difficult to regulate and enforce and can help to increase the flow of information as well as trust and credibility between authorities, industry and the public and NGOs.

PLENARY 6: INFORMATION COLLECTION, STANDARDS, SHARING, ACCESS, CREDIBILITY, AND USE
Terrence Shears from the Environment Agency for England and Whales and Coordinator of the European Network for the Implementation and Enforcement of Environmental Law (IMPEL) made introductions. He observed that information is the "life blood" of regulatory systems. He also noted that the European Community is taking steps to implement the requirements of the Aarhus Convention.

Ms. Cardenas, who Special Assistant to EPA Regional Administrator Greg Cook for Region 6, described EPA's Performance Track Initiative and related Texas state initiatives aimed at promoting the use of environmental management systems (EMSs) The Performance Track Initiative was described as a voluntary program that encourages companies to develop environmental management systems (EMS). The national program is only available to companies that have demonstrated compliance with environmental laws for a period of five years. The program began in 2000 and goes "above and beyond" compliance. EPA's criteria for the program is not rigid. For example, companies need not be ISO 14001 certified to participate.

Texas has also initiated a "Clean Texas Companies " program that also encourages the use of EMSs. Recent changes to the EPA and Texas programs now allow companies that qualify for one program to easily qualify for the other. EPA Region 6 was the first to conclude an MOU with a State to streamline the application procedures for the Federal program. Texas has also recently adopted regulations that promote the use of EMSs. EPA has also developed a pilot program called "E-Plans" that makes facility information available to emergency response officials over the Internet. Through a dedicated website, local emergency responders can access information on the hazards associated with certain facilities and can be better prepared to respond to emergencies. The program has been modified following the terrorist attacks on the U.S. last year and currently only emergency response teams and not the general public have access to the database of facility information.

Mr. Santosa founded the Indonesian Center for Environmental Law (ICEL) and is currently working on freedom of information initiatives in Indonesia. He noted that information access continues to be quite limited in Indonesia despite legal authorities that require the government to disclose information to the public. The Constitution, General Legislation and Environmental Legislation all provide some mechanisms for the public disclosure of environmental information. Specifically, provisions in the Environmental management Act No. 23/1997 and regulations related to environmental impact assessment establish the public's right to information. However, there are several barriers to the public availability of environmental information. These include the absence of established information management systems within the government and the lack of information producing activities within government agencies. Indonesian agencies also operate under a culture of secrecy.
Recent efforts to improve the situation include the introduction of the "Freedom of Information Bill." The Bill emphasizes "maximum access with limited exemptions." The proposed legislation is a comprehensive package that emphasizes:

The legislation also calls for penalties to be imposed on persons who intentionally block access to information. The prospect for final adoption of the legislation is unclear. Other efforts related to expanding information access include the promotion of information access in various regulatory, legislative and international initiatives. Work is ongoing within the Ministry of Environment on performance indicators. Information access has also figured prominently in NGO papers and advocacy in the run-up to the World Summit on Sustainable Development. Mr. Santosa noted that the challenge of expanding public access to information is made more difficult by the absence of strong public pressure for change.

Mr. Wang described several performance rating and disclosure initiatives under taken in various countries with the assistance of the World Bank. He reported that the World Bank had determined that indigenous enforcement, incomplete enforcement, informal regulation (often driven by public expectations in the absence of government regulations) and market responses to environmental news all play a role in the development of successful public disclosure initiatives. External pressure for pollution control can be brought to bear on polluters by the government, the community and markets. All of these pressure points are related and are more effective with robust information disclosure programs. Information disclosure often enhances the roles markets and the pubic play in pressuring industry to enhance its environmental performance. He cited the U.S. Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) and the "Scorecard" developed by Environmental Defense (a U.S.-based NGO) as successful performance reporting and disclosure models. These programs are generally viewed as "public-oriented environmental information systems." Together, these programs provide governments, the public and industry with important information on polluting facilities and pollutant releases. Historic data is also provided. The databases provide information on chemical releases but not necessarily risks to the community, but instead leave interpretation to the users of the data. A second approach to a public disclosure strategy can be described as "performance rating and disclosure. The World Bank had recently assisted Indonesia in the development of such a program based on a color rating systems for the environmental performance of industrial facilities. Facilities with high ratings are selected for public praise and recognition for their superior environmental performance while facilities with low scores would be identified as large polluters as a means of building public pressure on the companies. Early results suggest that polluting facilities are sensitive to this kind of public pressure and have improved their environmental performance.

Mr. Wang also described the China "Green Watch" program which is supported by the World Bank. The Green Watch program currently involves two pilot programs in two Chinese cities: Hohhot and Zhenjiang. Like the Indonesia program, this initiative seeks to categorize industrial facilities into an environmental performance ranking linked to five separate color categories (Green being the highest environmental performance). These rankings are made public through media releases. The results of the program have been positive and include better communication between the government and the public, commitments by polluters to enhance their environmental performance, and increased public awareness and participation. The Chinese government is considering ways to expand the pilot programs into a broader national initiative.

The first question posed for discussion: a representative of the U.S. EPA observed that the Agency had encountered problems accessing information available in other countries on environmental matters related to pesticides. She asked if the panelists had encountered similar problems. Ms. Cardenas noted that until recently, the U.S. had encountered problems in its efforts to obtain data on emission sources in Mexico that were believed to be contributing to air pollution problems in national parks in the border region. Mr. Santosa noted that in his experience, it was often easier to obtain information from governments by going through international institutions that can often obtain a better response to requests for information. A second question posed asked whether legislation is a pre-requisite to information access. Mr. Santosa noted that legislation requiring public disclosure was one of several important tools required to provide the public with information. In Indonesia, he views the proposed Freedom of Information Bill as an important "first step." All speakers agreed that the collection and public dissemination of environmental data can raise public awareness of environmental problems and can serve as an important driver in raising the environmental performance of industries

PANEL 7: THE EVOLVING ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY IN ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Rodriguez opened the panel by noting the increasing role of the judiciary in Latin America and South America. He noted that in Columbia, judges are now playing a major role in environmental enforcement and compliance as a result of Columbia's new constitution in 1991 and new environmental law in 1993. Also, in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Argentina, the judiciary is playing an increasingly important role in environmental enforcement and compliance. Mr. Rodriquez posed the questions: Why are some countries doing better in promoting environmental compliance and enforcement through judiciaries than others? What are the enabling conditions for the judiciary to play a major role in environmental enforcement?

Mr. Anderson posed the following questions: Are there any special roles for judges, and if so, what is the nature of that role in environmental enforcement? And: How do we define the judiciary? In the common law system, there is an independent judiciary protected by the state's constitution. In the exercise of judicial discretion, there is the perception that judges lack enthusiasm for environmental laws for several reasons. For example, judges believe that environmental crimes are morally ambiguous and they are reticent to stigmatize environmental violators as criminals. This traditional conservatism of common law judges must be overcome in order to realize more success in environmental cases with the judiciary. Regarding the participation by civil society, access to courts has traditionally been a limiting factor. However, there have been significant legislative developments in expanding the role of courts. The second major development is the effort to sensitize judges to the significance of environmental cases. This has been accomplished through mechanisms such as the UNEP judicial symposia. Finally, there has been innovative legislation in creating non-traditional environmental tribunals that seem to have great potential.

Judge Decleris asked us whether we shall continue on the road to a sustainable society or whether we will revert to "the good old days" before the Rio Summit. Is a sustainable society an attainable vision? If it is, guidance and creativity is needed to attain a sustainable society. The judiciary will be essential to providing this guidance and creativity for three reason: governments which are supposed to protect the environment actually are the source of conflicting policies; the judiciary succeeds better than government in reconciling conflicting policies; and common law was created by judges, so it is reasonable to expect that judges can create common law principles of sustainable development. Judge Decleris listed the 12 fundamentals of sustainable development, and closed by stating that if properly trained can succeed in achieving the principles of sustainable development.

Mr. Kurukulasuriya began by explaining that the UNEP program of environmental law is structured on a ten-year basis. Now, in its third ten-year program, the UNEP focus in environmental law has shifted in focus at the global, regional and national levels. The two major activities are in promoting the development of guidelines on environmental compliance and enforcement and second in strengthening the judiciary. Mr. Kurukulasuriya emphasized that the role of the judiciary includes promoting the rule of law including national environmental governance and promoting compliance and enforcement of environmental regulations. The UNEP has focused its efforts in strengthening the judiciary through six regional judicial symposia since 1996. These regional symposia have been successful in fostering judicial dialogue and exchange of experiences in the field of environmental law, establishing the basis for networking among the judiciary, the legal professional and academics, and promoting more vigorous and effective application of environmental law as an instrument for translating sustainable development policies into action.

George Kremlis from the European Commission stated that the EC will support the concept of judicial symposia and will support a judicial network to improve cooperation and exchange of experiences in the environmental arena. He said the European Court of Justice has become more environmentally aware. Training sessions for judges have been piloted at the European Court of Justice and there is discussion of creating an environmental chamber in the European Court of Justice by treaty amendment.

Questions: What are the enabling conditions for promoting sustainable development through the role of the judiciary? What role can INECE play in this area? There has been progressive development in the rule of law. However, there has been little development in procedure. Are we addressing procedural problems in environmental law?
Responses: INECE can play a role in helping to formulate a more systematic approach in addressing the role of the judiciary in promoting environmental compliance and enforcement. INECE can also promote an expanded basis for standing for civil society groups and assist in promoting judicial awareness of the need for strong enforcement of environmental cases. Judges have often used procedural issues to avoid making decisions in cases, including environmental matters. As with the concept of standing, procedural limitations should be addressed so courts are more accessible and more decisions on the merits are rendered in environmental cases.

WORKSHOP 2A - ENCOURAGING PUBLIC ROLE IN COMPLIANCE MONITORING AND IMPACT OF PUBLIC ACCESS TO ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION

Facilitators: Cornelia Quenet-Thielen and J. William Futrell
Rapporteur: Peyton Sturges

The session was designed to consider what mechanisms can be used to promote public involvement in environmental compliance, discuss those difficulties encountered by citizens and groups who attempt to obtain information, both from government agencies and companies with compliance or regulatory obligations. The attendees also considered difficulties in using information after it is obtained, whether from traditional sources or from Internet sites, and possible initiatives that could be implemented, whether by INECE members or by INECE itself, to help overcome these difficulties.

The discussions began with a review of existing public information access mechanisms in various countries, their strengths and weaknesses, and their relevance to other regions. Examples from the United States, Canada, and Brazil showed that legislative solutions designed to encourage public access are all limited by exceptions and exclusions that frustrate actual document production. Ironically, the lion's share of the use made of these laws, at least in the United States, is by corporate entities. The laws, in these instances can actually obfuscate, rather than clarify, issues for the public at large. For countries without any information access laws, these mechanisms are, of course, of little value.

While the attendees agreed that access to information is essential for improvement of environmental conditions and a powerful agent for achieving compliance, they also agreed that there must be a mechanism to ensure access and controls on the quality, as opposed to quantity of information provided. In some cases, participants said, responses are of either such complexity or such length as to make them unusable by the parties that request them. The less developed and technically sophisticated the public body, the more significant is this issue. Mechanisms allowing "intermediary translation" or requiring a governmental body to write simply, could help address this problem. The group also observed the inherent conflict of interest that agencies have that prevent them from meeting the public's information access needs.

All there was a sense that agencies, NGOs, and information seekers could use the Internet more effectively alike to insure that information accessed was usable. There was also a strong sentiment that the Internet is for many reasons not a panacea. From the provider standpoint, it was suggested that instead of posting excessive amounts of data on the web, resources could be better utilized by providing access "on demand" or only in response to specific request. From the user standpoint it was suggested that various initiatives by NGOs, or other organizations, perhaps even public, could help organize and prioritize the information sources so that access was more efficient There was also a consensus that different approaches, perhaps including more grass roots oriented outreach, to educating the public were most effective in many countries and regions.

The session concluded with a discussion of whether INECE could play a role in solving some of the problems of improving access to valuable compliance information. It was agreed that increased emphasis on the matter, both technically or web-based, and more education and outreach oriented initiatives, could be appropriate projects for INECE to pursue to fill the need for better information access, information access systems, and outreach training to better empower public participation in this important component of the environmental enforcement regime.

WORKSHOP 2B: GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS TO ENCOURAGE AND RESPOND TO PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT IN ENFORCEMENT

Workshop 2B dealt with government programs to encourage and respond to public involvement in Enforcement. Participants from many different regions, organizations and expertise attended the workshop and shared their experiences on public participation programs. The America's, Africa, Europe, Middle East and South East Asia were represented. Participants stressed the importance of public participation in order to get better decisions, policies and legislation.

The goals of the workshop were:
- Identify Government programs and implementing methodology as regards public participation.
- How do you make it an effective program
- Identify ways for INECE to assist capacity building

These goals were met through identifying the critical success factors and lessons learned.
One of the main difficulties in identifying the common grounds between the government programs on public participation appeared to be the difference in legal, technical and development level of the countries participating in the workshop. Despite of these differences the workshop was able to define some basic principles that are necessary to develop effective programs for involving the public. These principles are:

The INECE network could be used, on a case study basis, to review the critical success factors and lessons learned. A report with the analyses of the results and recommendations on principles on involving the public in enforcement could be used to create new government programs. This would be specifically helpful for countries that do not have experience in public participation or do not have frameworks on public participation. Exchange of best practices can also be reached through the organization of regional meetings.

Introduction
There is many interest in voluntary compliance programs. The term "voluntary" is in most in most cases incorrect. During the session there was an interesting discussion about the definition of voluntary compliance and the different types in all the participated countries.

Key points coming out of the discussion:
Voluntary compliance does not really exist. There is always a "stick" that brings the company to a way of compliance. You can define different types of sticks:

Some of these items may seem voluntary, but in reality it always more or less enforced voluntary. In most of the cases, it is better to speak of "motivated compliance".

Sometimes companies go beyond the limits of the environmental laws. That is a voluntary process. But mostly there are strong economic incentives (image, publicity).

A certain kind of voluntary process does exist in the case of agreements between the government and certain types of industries to reduce environmental pollution or to reduce the use of natural resources without existing environmental regulations. Such an agreement contains always an evaluation moment, which means that in case of lack of results the government will as yet come with new regulations.

The discussion made clear that there is no "voluntary" compliance without regulations en requirements with which all must comply.

During the discussion some participants made the point that in many (mostly developing) countries the environmental framework already does exist but still is very weak. There is not enough enforcement capacity. And many companies does not have the right information about the environmental regulations and what they have to do. In that case the government can stimulate "voluntary" compliance by information- and assistance programs. The public-awareness and the public-pressure also can be stimulated by such an information program. Public pressure is important for "voluntary" compliance and can be used in case of lack of enforcement capacity.

Environmental management systems (EMS) and ISO-certification can help in compliance programs. Also other types of certification (blue flag, eco-tourism, CST, etc.) can be helpful. They are mostly based on economic incentives. But all that systems cannot come instead of environmental regulation and enforcement by the government. Thereby it is necessary that each type of certification needs its own transparent system of auditing, correction and enforcement.

Some participants made the point that there is a difference between big and small/medium companies. The last group does have more problems to comply with the regulations (costs, information, knowledge). Also the enforcement is sometimes very difficult (many small companies all over the country). Special programs to stimulate "voluntary" compliance can be more effective (for example in Austria the ECO-profit program).

Facilitators: Markku Hietamaki and Krzysztof Michalak
Rapporteur: Davis Jones
Workshop Goals: Determine INECE's role in promoting the use of self-monitoring systems.

Questions presented by Facilitators:
1. Why is self monitoring useful?
2. How good must the data be, and how should cost of collecting the data be considered?
3. Are there legal barriers or problems to collecting and/or using the data?
4. What methods can be utilized to guarantee the quality of the data submitted?

Papers Presented:
1. Markku Hietamaki made a presentation describing innovations in the Finnish reporting system. The paper was submitted to INECE, and should be published in Volume II of the proceedings.
2. IMPEL has done two related projects, both available at at http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/impel:
i. Report on Operator Self Monitoring
ii. Best Practices on Compliance monitoring
3. INECE has published "Source Self-Monitoring, Reporting, and Recordkeeping Requirements: an International Comparison," which is available on the Web. (Please note: this is a very large pdf file.)

Discussion:
Markku Hietamaki began by describing the self-monitoring system in Finland. Monitoring parameters are set forth in the installation's permit which also prescribes the monitoring methods to be used, the frequency, etc. The information is collected by the installation and sent into the agency. New initiatives are in progress to facilitate electronic submittal of data, including data submittal directly and in real time from the installations internal computer systems directly into the agency's data bank.

Inga Lindgreen said that the Swedish system is very similar to the system Markku described. Why do are installations willing to self-monitoring instead of relying on the regulatory agency to monitor themselves? Through self-monitoring the facility can demonstrate compliance with their permit and can make decisions about production levels. With this in mind, industry should quickly get feedback from monitoring system so they can quickly resolve problems. If the state is doing all the monitoring, the information can't get back to industry quickly enough to stop releases. In Sweden, there are some limits on how much information the agency can collect. For example, they can't collect production data, so hard to do cross checks comparing production to emissions.

Daniel Geisbacher asked about laboratories that test the samples? Are they approved or accredited by the government or can any laboratory conduct the analysis? In Sweden only accredited labs can be used.

This raised the question of how "good" does the information need to be and how different programs ensure the quality of the data. One means to achieve data quality is to mandate that all monitoring use the same methods of collection. Another is to state the quality of data collected using statistical representations of uncertainty (confidence intervals). The EU has proposed defined standards that guarantee reproducibility but not necessarily accuracy. Therefore, some representation of uncertainty is necessary.

In Australia, pollution loading fees are collected per unit of pollution, so the government need accurate data to determine fees. When collecting the data to determine the loading, installations must use a laboratory accredited by the national government, or, if using non-certified labs, send some split samples to certified labs to demonstrate the accuracy of the results. Nonetheless, there are concerns with clarity in applying monitoring requirements.

Inga Larsson cited another reason for using self-monitoring for collecting compliance data instead of government monitoring. In many applications, self-monitoring gets continuous data, regulators can not. In Sweden, the system has developed since the 1940's and has become very sophisticated. The regulator and the company can judge and assess uncertainties. All installations must use the same methodology, and the regulatory authority needs to follow the same procedures to verify the quality of their own data. Donna Cambell added that self- monitoring has advantages for long-term averages and showing relationships to production.

Erik Forberg said that the way data is collected depends on what we are going to do with the data. The accuracy of data does not only depend on the accredited laboratory, but the sampling itself is more critical than lab work, and guidance for the sampling procedures is limited. Inspections should focus on the procedures the facility uses to collect the data, not on sampling ourselves. Davis Jones agreed that the cost of taking confirmatory samples make it difficult or impossible for the government to regularly sample and analysis the data, so in the United States, compliance inspections also focus more on the company's procedures than independently collecting data.

Hans-Rol Lindgreen suggested that self-monitoring requirements be designed to use mechanisms that industry is already utilizing for process controls. This allows them to collect the data the government needs in the most efficient way possible.

Markku Hietamaki raised the issue of the amount of detail and volume of data the government needs. The group agreed that while detailed data should be collected, the installation can submit a summary, as long as they keep details and make the base data available for review. There are additional things we can do to increase the compatibility of the data. EU legislation is moving to deal with uncertainty, but industries are going toward collection methods.

Donna Cambell asked the group if their programs get all the data collected, or just information that shows noncompliance? In Sweden, both compliance and non-compliance is submitted to the agency. The United States also requires submittal of both types of information.

Daniel Geisbacher described the key elements in the Slovak system. Legislation requires self-monitoring through the operation permit. Facilities and the State must use approved laboratories. All laboratories use the same methods, but uncertainty still exists due to laboratory or operator error. Industry has a natural incentives to hide upsets, etc. So what are the motivations for industry to report noncompliance and not hide problems? First, the state measurements provide cross check. In addition, the state can use information requests to gather additional information or require additional sampling.

Markku Hietamaki moved the conversation to verification of submitted data and the likelihood and consequences of falsifying data. In Finland, there is a long history with different relationships between the government, industry and the public. It is very unlikely that industry will falsify data. If they get caught, the government is forced to take very drastic actions which are much more costly than compliance. One big case in the pulp and paper industry in 1970's has lead industry to publicize reports, improve methods, etc. The current system in Finland has strong monitoring requirements, frequent inspections, and, if there are still problems, the government will step in and conduct the monitoring themselves and bill the company.

The transparency of the data collection system is crucial to get the public involved in compliance. Most companies are more frightened of headlines than penalties. Making the data public on the Internet so anyone can view can be a crucial motivator toward compliance and pollution prevention. However, production data and sensitive information should be kept private. In Finland, the national system does contain production data and other industries can access each other's data. Sweden also has a very open system; all data is open to the public but competitors aren't that interested, since process data is not included.

In Slovak, there is free access to environmental data directly from industry to public. The owner of the data provides the data to the public; the agency does not serve that function and gets the data as the public gets it without redistributing it as occurs in other countries. By contrast, in Finland, the agency receives the data, checks its validity, then presents to the public. Different data come from different sources, and there are concerns about quality and understanding of complex data. Many big companies agree that it is the authorities' role to collect and publish data, not the role of industry.

In Australia, data is available to the public, but is rarely requested. Companies submit an annual compliance report to agency that then gets posted on web. There are sever penalties for inaccurate reports.

What are the legal barriers, if any, to collecting self-monitoring data? Inga Larrson said that in Sweden there is no problem if collecting required data, but if inspectors ask for additional information or monitoring, that information cannot be used for prosecution. However, if a legal request is made the data can be used. Donna said that the Australian legal protection from self-incrimination doesn't apply to corporations, so their information can be used against them. Erik Forberg said that in Norway, inspectors can use self-monitoring data, and can ask for as much additional information as they need. Daniel said that in Slovak, they can use the data for certain penalties such as not meeting conditions of permits. The government generally uses basic self-monitoring information from inspections for smaller cases, but collect their own data to support prosecution.

In Australia, the cost of compliance monitoring is paid by the operator, which is part of the "polluter pays" principle. This does not mean we should ask for expensive monitoring. The government should be focused only on the needs for verifying compliance and monitoring should be appropriate for those needs and not excessive. To help keep the costs down, they require limited monitoring during a long period coupled with a short period of special monitoring and analysis to support the quality of regular monitoring.

These are the same principles as in Sweden; any required monitoring needs to be relevant to the permit. Continual monitoring may be required for such things as acidity of effluent from pulp and paper production, but only occasional monitoring is required for something like dioxin, which is very expensive to analyze. In Sweden, the cost to the government is not an issue since the company pays for government sampling, too.

Data quality is dependent on the ultimate use of the data and purpose of collection. If the data is merely an estimate of pollutant releases, e.g. Pollution Release and Transfer Registers systems, then emission factors that may not always produce quality data, may be sufficient. Continuous emission monitoring requirements are not necessary, and administrative quality checking procedures may be sufficient.

Conclusion:
Only northern countries were represented in the workshop so we were hesitant to come up with action items or decisions for INECE. However, we did agree that the use of self monitoring is increasing , but may vary based on needs. Common definitions must be developed so the international community can speak with similar understanding. We also recognized that data produced by self-monitoring can be used in different purposes like in PRTR but also in the compliance monitoring arena. Self monitoring should be a part of training courses organized under INECE's umbrella, and INECE should help distribute and publicise case studies and examples so that countries can share experience and expand existing work to global scale.

2E: ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS: INSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR COLLECTION, MANAGEMENT, AND ACCESS
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Questions presented by Facilitators:
1. What is good way to bridge the communication gap between management and field operation units?
2. What methods can be used to ensure that information collected by countries is accurate? How are countries doing and performing in terms of this question?
3. Is information useful (accessible) for lower level workers (managers, inspectors, etc.) in order to enable them to apply it effectively in their work?
4. Are countries using geographic information systems (GIS) to make linkages between areas or to assist in environmental decision-making/priority setting?
5. How are attorneys in Honduras managing access to information from the Ministry of the Environment?
6. How can INECE assist information sharing and distribution? Can INECE provide a needs assessment?

Question 1: What is good way to bridge the communication gap between management and field operation units?
Luna suggested that we should begin by defining local information systems. Mr. Luna asked: are there countries where companies are not required to turn over information on environmental performance?
Magro noted that the European Union requires information and inspections. Portugal has been a member of the EU since 1986. Those who work the databases receive training. Self-monitoring is required of companies.
Watkinson noted that information/data extended beyond performance indicators to the actors in the equation (even those outside of the normally monitored sphere). Feedback is critical to the ground-workers (individuals either creating, responding to, preventing environmental problems).

Question 2: What methods can be used to ensure that information collected by countries is accurate? How are countries doing and performing in terms of this question?
Question 3: Is information useful (accessible) for lower level workers (managers, inspectors, etc.) in order to enable them to apply it effectively in their work?
Linsin gave the example that in relation to CFCs, comparing databases to see where differences and conflicts arise in relation to the same operators can reveal discrepancies, inconsistencies, and accuracy. Linsin questioned whether systems that can be used to verify the information coming in.
Wolff discussed the use of NIPS (numerically integrated profiling system) which can be used for tasks including comparing imports/exports for what was entering in the border and for data mining. Programs (platforms) are available from the US government (Customs Services).
Magro noted that the same inspector will never visit a given site twice to allow for different perspectives. Coordinators read reports to evaluate both the information and the different stories.
Watkinson noted that regarding the European Union, use of standardizing reporting, available through Brussels (centralized), may be inefficient.

Question 4- Are countries using geographic information systems (GIS) to make linkages between areas or to assist in environmental decision-making/priority setting?
Pascoe noted that the US is using GIS as emergency response tool in the Great Lakes area (oil spills). GIS tools can be used to project where the spill will hit the shore and what species will be impacted. Resource managers can then use this information to prevent impact. For example, they can quickly locate and prioritize sensitive habitat areas for protection. In the long term, GIS can assist in determining if environment is improving, based on work government and industry has undertaken.
Watkinson raised the issue of data transparency versus sensitivity by questioning how to maintain sensitive information on a need-to-know basis.
Miocic noted that in Croatia, systems exist for military but not used for environmental purposes. The Ministry of the Environment is trying to encourage information-sharing between the ministries so as to not duplicate cost and work. However, if the military collects the data through consultants, should Ministry of the Environment do it again?
Markowitz argued that data collection for environmental projects needs to be collected in a way that fulfills the intended purpose.
Linsin noted the need to ensure that law enforcement officials do not direct the regulators specifically for criminal enforcement purposes.
Cruden noted that publicizing data informs people and also keeps companies in check (reputation). Tensions develop from concerns about security breaches (e.g. access to such information vis terrorism). U.S. is drowning in data [although it of course should be noted that countries may be lacking data collection tools and infrastructure to maintain large databases] Nevertheless, not every company is providing data. If every company does not, then the database may be incomplete or inaccurate. INECE should make recommendations about data-sharing efficiencies and about how data collection and database maintenance could be best managed.
Wolff gave the example of a petroleum extractor in Niger Delta region. Corporations use monitoring systems effectively, because they recognize the benefits. Not so to same extent for governments [Again, this is big business, what about small/local businesses?]. The majority of information is available - and examples include information layering for use by different users, RAMSAR (Wetland Convention) sites, using satellite imagery of sites to determine change over time (benefits of small cost).
Arrieta argued this is not the reality for many user groups who could benefit from efficient data-sharing. Developing countries have no data. The international environmental community requires that countries provide reports, but information is lacking. INECE could assess what countries could do to achieve this level.

Question 5: How are attorneys in Honduras managing access to information from the Ministry of the Environment?
Corruption impacts the transfer of information. The Attorney General mistrusts what the lawyers will use the information for. These processes are not carried out in accordance to the law. Ministry of Environment is under criminal proceeding, as well as Forestry, etc. Change in government has led to increased coordination. In relation to NGOs, the Attorney General is interested in improving their relationship. NGOs have an easier time filing complaints than individuals (not international organizations). Many NGOs currently have filed complaints. Furthermore, there is a move to use the NGOs as witnesses, experts, and information providers.
Magro warned that this is an area to be very careful with. As the system develops, NGOs play an increasingly less important role. Careful with the projects you give to NGOs because some projects can side-track them. If you give them a project, then they will shut up.
Martinez noted that it is one thing to have a database on the state of environment, and another thing to have a database on a particular topic.
Recommendations: In areas of limited resources - Get someone who's a mover to convince someone with the money to invest. Or look for where the information already exists and try to get access to that.

In the US, programs have started out at critical sites (high sensitivity, such as Chesapeake Bay), then developed from there. The disconnect between data handlers and data managers has developed over time (since the information became housed).
Croatia has an obligation to create environmental agency, and haven been given the choice between a large or small agency, chose to develop a small-scale one. The agency is using experts to focus on specific problems (e.g. getting assistance from the EU) and will then build from there.

Recommendations:
1. Devise a questionnaire for the Web site. What do people/groups need? What are the critical issues?
2. Share information on experiences. Give examples from other countries. Organize simply, in a way that countries can access info & advice from similarly situated countries (experiences).

INECE could organize a mission to developing countries to assist with start up. For example, INECE could support sending a team of experts to NIS countries to help organize and develop programs (note - Armenia receives a significant amount of help/resources, but does not know how to use them most effectively). INECE must consider that obstacles might be in the government system of the countries; need to develop/plan so that the "delegation" is well received and that the support is effective.
INECE should further consider how to maintain momentum. If projects are to be effective, they must be sustainable beyond good ideas and base funds. For example, coordinating with the regional organizations (infrastructure) could assist in maintenance.

[Discussion ends focused on assisting developing countries. Has discussion sufficiently addressed the global issues? What are the recommendations for INECE in terms of industrialized country needs?]

Those interested in participating in an informal working group with INECE to advance these ideas: Roy Watkinson, Cesar Luna, Evan Wolff.