ENFORCING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS WITHIN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Robert H.
Donkers, EC coordinator in the Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and
Environment, Director of the Brussels' Office
General
Introduction
This
paper will discuss the way in which environmental agreements within the
European Community (EC) and those between the EC and other states or groups of
states are implemented and enforced.
Further, it will look at which difficulties arise in implementing and
enforcing these agreements, and finally, the scope for improvement will be
investigated.
First,
the nature of EC environmental legislation should be addressed. In Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome,
several types of Community legislation are set out. They are Regulations, which are directly applicable laws in the
Member States; Directives which are binding as to the results to be achieved
but leave Member States to choose the form and methods in which these are to be
reflected in their national legislation, and Decisions, which are directly
binding in their entirety upon those to whom the decision is addressed.
The vast
majority of EC environmental legislation is in the form of Directives, enabling
Member States to accommodate -if necessary- already existing legislation. To date, Regulations and Decisions have been
used only rarely for environmental matters except for some measures in
connection with international agreements.
The Commission of the EC has, for example, recently tabled a draft regulation
for the implementation of the Montreal Protocol in view of the possible
revision in 1990. It is expected that
later this year a draft Regulation will be tabled on the implementation of the
Basel Convention on transboundary shipments of chemical and toxic waste.
If one
compares the different types of EC legislation it becomes clear that
Regulations and, if certain conditions are met, also Decisions have a
self-executing character, where Directives, as such, are not self-executing. However jurisprudence of the European Court
of Justice shows that the self-execution of a Directive can be invoked by the
public in cases where a directive adequately implemented and/or not implemented
within a set of time.
1. Formal
and practical compliance with EC legislation
Formal compliance
As
referred to above, Directives usually require Member States to implement them
in national legislation. Directives
indicate the period for implementation.
This period varies from 1 to 3 years.
Member States have to send to the Commission within a given period any
(new) national legislation that gives formal effect to a Directive. As 'Guardian' of the Treaty, the Commission
has the duty to control whether the measures adopted are adopted in time and
whether they are adequate.
Recent
reports of the Commission indicate that Member States seriously fail to
(adequately) implement EC environmental legislation. In 60 cases Directives were not implemented at all; in 90 cases
only partly and in 213 cases not adequately.
Cases on legislation on water (104) and on nature protection (129) form
the largest part of these cases. These
figures seem very serious, but are very relative. As will be shown later, the Commission is unnecessarily strict in
controlling the texts of national legislation.
On the other hand these figures do not indicate how poor the practical
implementation in Member States, actually is.
As the
paper on the European Community's prospects for enforcement of directives
already deals with the procedural steps in cases of no (adequate) formal
compliance, it needs only to be stated here that the final step in the
procedure is a verdict of the Court of Justice in Luxemburg stating that
non-compliance has occurred and, in urgent cases, summoning a member state to
immediately introduce the necessary (provisional) measures. If a member state continues to fail to adopt
the legislation required, the Commission can only yet again bring the state
before the European Court. At the
present time no other sanctions are available.
In
addition, no correspondence between the Commission and the Member States on the
implementation of Directives is available to the public. However, the Commission has indicated in the
4th EC Action Programme that it will allow public access to its data base
(CELEX) which stores information on the national legislation which formally
implements Community law.
Practical
compliance
Environmental
quality does not improve as a result of formal compliance as demonstrated in
the Public Journal. Indeed the interest
of EC legislation goes beyond formal compliance.
Usually,
however, Directives do not ask Member States to inform the Commission of any
practical steps taken. Some Directives
oblige Member States to set up programmes to reduce pollution and most Directives
ask for regular report on the experiences in executing the obligations of the
Directive. More specifically it may be
asked to enumerate and evaluate any exemptions of the provisions granted
(assuming a Directive introduces possibilities and criteria for granting
exemptions). In some Directives it is
stated that the Commission, on the basis of these reports will inform the
Council of ministers and the European Parliament as to the results and effects
of the legislation concerned and may put forward any proposals necessary to
modify European legislation. Most
Directives have set up a committee with representatives of the Member States
and the Commission, which discuss the scope for any modifications of a Directive,
necessary on the basis of scientific and technical progress. Some committees even have power to vote on
these modifications. In these
committees experience on the application of Directives is being exchanged.
It should
be noted here, however, that the Commission has no inspectorate to monitor the
practice in the Member States.
To date
the Commission has put its limited available energy and manpower toward the
control of the formal compliance of the legislation in spite of the fact that
the 4th Action Programme has announced that more emphasis will be put on the
control of practical implementation.
Until now the Commission has only reacted to complaints put to the
Commission by the public.
Problems
experienced by Member States in
the implementation process
As the
texts of most Directives represent, in the final analysis, political
compromises reached by 12 Member States, the usual occurrence is that certain
obligations are intentionally not clearly formulated and therefore are not easy
to implement. Further, the final
legislation is a compromise in the sense that it is the result of 1000 years of
Common Law practice and 150 years of the Napoleonic Code, which means that
Directives are never easily implemented in the existing national legislative
structure and culture of Member States.
In the
case of the Netherlands the relatively long legislative process, including the
consultation of a wide variety of interests, is a definite obstacle for the
timely introduction of EC legislation.
Furthermore in the Dutch situation, a vast amount of environmental
legislation already exists. It has been
shown that it is much more difficult to change existing legislation and
practice than to introduce EC legislation where no national legislation has
been adopted. Where national
legislation is already in place, one often finds lack of political interest in
giving priority to the timely implementation of EC legislation which would add
little to national legislation.
However, even where practical compliance with EC legislation already
exists, for example, on the basis of permits granted on the basis of the not
yet modified national legislation, the Commission regards any delay in
implementing Community law to be a violation of the Treaty. To give an example: the Commission is
considering taking the Netherlands to the European Court because formal
legislation to implement a directive on the introduction of lead free petrol is
not yet in place. The practical
situation, however, is that, in advance of the necessary legislative measures,
on the basis of voluntary agreements with industry a year before the Directive
came into force, more than 6000 filling stations were supplying unleaded
petrol. Another example is provided in
the field of environmental impact assessment.
On the basis of a complaint the Commission has sent the Dutch Government
a letter asking to adapt the legislation on environmental impact assessment
because of the fact that on some very minor points, the Dutch legislation
differs from the EC Directive text. The
Dutch government is of course willing to remedy this situation. However, it may be understood that since the
Dutch law and practice with EIA are considered exemplary (particularly in the
European context) and go far beyond the minimum requirements set out in the
Directive, the political pressure to change the law quickly, is not
existent. There are other
priorities. The Netherlands may,
therefore, be taken to the European Court by the Commission for non-compliance
with the Directive, where at same time the European Commission takes use and
advantage of the progressive nature of the Dutch legislation and practice in
this field.
Another
example: Luxemburg has officially adopted legislation to control the
titaniumdioxide industry although no such industry is foreseen in that
country. The Commission has considered
in the past to take Ireland to the Court because it refused to implement the
same Directive, even though such industries do not exist in Ireland either.
These
examples show that it is possible to have formal compliance without practical
compliance and vice versa.
Recently
the Commission has started to call for meetings with national authorities
responsible for the execution of the provisions of a Directive, with a view
toward having experience exchanged on the problems raised in implementing these
provisions into national law and on any practical experience.
2.
Enforcement provisions in EC legislation
Article 5
of the Treaty of Rome states that Member States have the obligation to take all
measures to ensure the compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and with
the legislation based on the Treaty.
They have to refrain from any measures which might jeopardize the
realisation of the objectives of the Treaty.
No sanctions are mentioned in case of non compliance.
On the
basis of an overall analysis of EC legislation it can be concluded that apart
from provisions with obligations for Member States to adopt legislation and
take administrative measures to comply with the Community legislation and the
obligation to report regularly to the Commission on the experiences with the
execution of the Community legislation, no other enforcement provisions yet
exist on the policing of the legislation adopted. The enforcement and policing are left completely to the Member
States. The same is true for decisions
on agreements in relation to third states or groups of states. So far the Commission has not acted to
control the formal and practical compliance of Member States with international
agreements which the EC and therefore directly or indirectly the Member States,
are Party to. As was shown before in
one of the preceding papers, only a few international agreements have included
provisions on the control or the execution of the agreement, as in the case of
the Conventions on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea (Barcelona and
Athens Conventions), where a system of permanent control is introduced on the
basis of programmes or for example the Rhine Convention where a monitoring and
warning system has been set up. The EC
is Party to the Conventions mentioned.
To date the Commission has not checked the compliance with these
Conventions.
In the
draft Regulation on the implementation of the Montreal Protocol a provision has
been introduced on the inspection/monitoring on the execution of the
Regulation. It includes inter alia,
the assistance of EC officials to national officials, if the member state gives
its consent, in cases involving the investigation of a company producing CFC'S,
regarding the practical compliance with the Regulation.
3. Scope
for improvements
Inclusion
of enforcement provisions in EC legislation
It is
recommended that, as far as possible, specific provisions be included in
Directives and Regulations related to the practical enforcement of EC
legislation. For example, the Council
is currently considering is a Commission proposal on the adaptation of the
European test cycle for passenger cars as part of the type approval
procedure. This proposal also includes
the setting of standards for exhaust emissions, specifically on CO, NOx, HC and
particulates. In addition, some
durability requirements are proposed.
The Dutch delegation has proposed that requirements also include
provisions for allowing authorities to introduce a callback system whereby
random tests of cars already brought in circulation can be conducted to check
whether the cars perform as they should perform on the basis of the type
approval.
Furthermore
a periodic technical control-system should be introduced in all Member States.
(This already takes place in the Netherlands on an annual basis).
The creation of an Inspectorate
As was
previously mentioned, the Commission has no inspectorate to monitor the
practical compliance with EC environmental legislation. This is left to the member States. The Treaty prescribes the division of powers
between the Community institutions themselves and between the EC and the Member
States. Member States play a very
crucial part: they have legislative capacity in the Council of ministers; they
must execute the legislation and finally they have to control the practical
implementation. The Commission can only
control the formal implementation.
Sanctions, other than a verdict on non- compliance by the Court of
Luxemburg, are not existent.
In
another Treaty of the Community, the Euratom Treaty, Article 77 and subsequent
Articles give the Commission powers to control the compliance with the licenses
granted to use nuclear material. The
Commission may, for example, send a team of inspectors to a country with the
consent of the government concerned.
The
system applied under the Euratom Treaty might, with certain modifications, be
useful in the EC environment context as well.
At the
same time the EC could help Member States to set up an adequate inspectorate
themselves for the monitoring of compliance (This is already happening on a
bilateral basis. For example, on the
basis of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministries of the
Environment of Portugal and the Netherlands, Dutch inspectors are assisting their
Portuguese counterparts in setting up an inspectorate. The Commission should have an interest in
promoting and supporting such initiatives).
The
Provision of Country reports
A system
of country reports, which for example already exists in the framework of the
OECD, might be introduced on a voluntary basis to monitor, via an environmental
audit, the state of the environment in a member state. The Commission and the member state
concerned could then react on the basis of the recommendations of the audit
team. More specifically, a pool of experts
could be created at the EC level to help competent authorities to adequately
formulate the conditions in permits and/or give a second opinion on the
practical compliance by a certain branch of industry.
Making
information available to the public
As was
mentioned above, the Commission has, to date, only reacted on practical
non-compliance on the basis of complaints from the public. This right of complaint is, in theory a
powerful instrument. However, the
public does not always have in every state the right of access to the
information needed to check the compliance or noncompliance of for example,
industry. At its meeting of 22 March
1990 the EC Council of Ministers adopted a Directive which introduces the right
of access for the public. In certain
circumstances this right can not be invoked, for example where information on
national security, information on private persons or commercial information is
concerned.
The
Council of Ministers also recently decided on the creation of a European
Environment Agency which will set up a network in the EC on the exchange of
information, building further on the already existing CORINE programme and will
assist the Commission and Member States in the gathering and scientific
evaluation of data which are necessary for the development of environmental
policy.
The
European Parliament has, inter alia asked that an inspectorate be
included as part of the new Agency. For
the time being the Council has decided to return within two years after the
creation of the Agency to consider other possible tasks of the Agency. In principle other European, non EC-states
may become part of the Agency.
These new
initiatives which come into force within a few years may play an important role
in the practical enforcement of EC legislation.
Financial
sanctions
It is
clear that non-compliance with EC legislation might create considerable damage
to the environment as well as to property both in the physical and in the
financial sense. Non- compliance can
also create distortions in competition between industries.
It is,
therefore, suggested that in the environment field provisions used in other
areas of Community policy also be applied.
Such provisions would include those provisions based on the Coal and
Steel Treaty, where industry has to pay considerable fines when, for example,
they produce and sell more steel than they are allowed. If a company pollutes more than allowed and
is not willing to take appropriate measures, a fine should be possible. In very serious cases a (temporary) shut
down could be introduced. These
economic sanctions already exist in Dutch legislation and could be introduced
on the EC level.
The
Community can grant some subsidies on the basis of the so called structural
funds, for example the Regional Fund and the Agriculture Fund. One might consider the possibility of
delaying certain payments or even introducing the possibility of penalties as
long as a Member State is not willing to take the appropriate measures in the
environment field. Certain types of
projects which are subsidized under the structural funds can have significant
impact on the environment such as the construction of roads, tunnels, ports
etc. or the restructuring of industry.
It is
difficult to understand why the EC is subsidizing projects which might increase
pollution on the one hand and, on the other hand, is not using the same
financial mechanism to enforce EC legislation in the environment field.
Cooperation
between national police forces and the Courts
With the
internal market and therefore the abolishment of frontiers near at hand, the
necessity of cooperation between national police forces and the Courts is
increasing.
On the
basis of "the European Legal Assistance Convention"
(Rechtshulpverdrag) of 1959 to which all Western European Countries are Party,
the competences of and the coordination between the competent authorities in
the EC countries could be improved and extended.
4. Final
remarks
It is
clear from the preceding paragraphs that politicians and lawyers have created
an impressive amount of EC legislation without taking into account how it is
actually implemented. It is like
adopting a law to abolish the law of gravity without having considered how to
enforce such legislation in practice.
If EC
environment policy wants to maintain support from the public or even improve
its credibility, it is time to commit much more manpower to the enforcement of
EC and international agreements through the introduction of specific provisions
and control to that end as in the case of disarmament control or the
non-proliferation agreement. It is
doubtful, however, whether politicians are prepared to provide for such
provisions in the environment field.
Most states do not yet appear to be ready to relinquish any of their
sovereignty in this area. Losing some
of their sovereignty, however, may be the price states have to pay for the
maintenance of the planet earth.
The proof
of the cake is in the eating not the recipe.
The forthcoming discussions on the revision of the Montreal Protocol and
the negotiations on a world climate convention are some test cases for
politicians as well as for experts to take up their responsibility.
Literature
1 Hannequart, J.P.,
Enforcement of and compliance with EC environmental law, European Environment
Bureau, Brussels, 1986
2. Pallemaerts, M.
and A. Kallia-Antoniou, Report of the Seminar on the implementation and
enforcement of EC environmental legislation, European Environment Bureau,
Brussels, 1986
3. Haigh, N, EEC
environmental policy and Britain, Longman, Harlow, Essex, 1984/1987
4. Donkers, R.H. in :
Europees Milieurecht, Colloquium Asser Instituut, The Hague, 1987
5. 4th EEC
Environmental Action Programme (1987-1992), Public Journal C 70, 1987
6. Donkers, R.H. e.a., De uitvoering van
EG milieurichtlijnen, Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1988.